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Abstract
The recently rising field of Critical Data Studies is still facing fundamental questions. Among these is the enigma of digital
subjectivation. Who are the subjects of Big Data? A field where this question is particularly pressing is finance. Since the
1990s traders have been steadily integrated into computerized data assemblages, which calls for an ontology that
eliminates the distinction between human sovereign subjects and non-human instrumental objects. The latter subjectivize
traders in pre-conscious ways, because human consciousness runs too slow to follow the volatility of the market. In
response to this conundrum Social Studies of Finance has drawn on Actor-Network Theory to interpret financial
markets as technically constructed networks of human and non-human actors. I argue that in order to develop an
explicitly critical data study it might be advantageous to refer to Maurizio Lazzarato’s theory of machinic subjugation
instead. Although both accounts describe financial digital subjectivation similarly, Lazzarato has the advantage of coupling
his description to a clear critique of and resistance to finance.
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This planet has – or rather had – a problem, which was
this: most of the people living on it were unhappy for
pretty much of the time. Many solutions were suggested
for this problem, but most of these were largely con-
cerned with the movement of small green pieces of
paper, which was odd because on the whole it wasn’t
the small green pieces of paper that were unhappy.
(Douglas Adams, 1992)
In 2014, Dalton and Thatcher launched a series of key
research questions for the rising ﬁeld of Critical Data
Studies (CDS). Among these are: ‘‘Who are the subjects
of ‘Big Data’?’’ (Dalton and Thatcher, 2014). How are
people integrated into data assemblages? If CDS theor-
ists are right to suggest that data are never raw, but
always dependent on social contexts that render data
meaningful (Kitchin, 2014: 20), then the question arises
what kind of subject is needed to cook the data.
Kitchin (2014: 165) shortly hints at Louis Althusser’s
theory of interpellation to make sense of subjectivation.
In that case we should understand data-driven institu-
tions as ideological state apparatuses that construct
data practices to hail individuals by presenting them
images of their identity, with which these individuals
can identify (Althusser, 2014: 232–272). For instance,
the Jawbone Up (Lupton, forthcoming) is a device that
measures users’ sleep data and presents it to them so
that they can ‘discover’ their sleep identity. Although
this approach makes sense for some data practices it
certainly does not apply to the whole domain. Data
practices rarely address individuals’ consciousness.
Not all data-gathering institutions are, for instance,
inclined to share collected data with their
subjects (Pasquale, 2015: 9; Tene and Polonetsky,
Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Belgium
Corresponding author:
Tim Christiaens, Institute of Philosophy, Erasmushuis, Leuven 3000,
Belgium.
Email: t.christiaens@kuleuven.be
Big Data & Society
July–December 2016: 1–15





Creative Commons Non Commercial CC-BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 3.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction
and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages
(https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
2013: 254–255). As has already been well established,
this secrecy leads to normative problems concerning
privacy, dataveillance, control creep, etc. (Boyd and
Crawford, 2012: 673; Innes, 2001; Kitchin, 2014: 165–
183; Lyon, 2014). Of equal importance however is that,
even if people are confronted with the data, conscious-
ness rarely ﬁgures as a mediator for subjectivation
(Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 165). Instead the ‘quantiﬁed
self’ is a conglomerate of subconsciously extracted
data, which is used to subconsciously inﬂuence behav-
iour. Internet companies mostly gather aggregated data
on populations in order to construct ﬂuid proﬁles that
govern the conduct of these populations proﬁtably. Big
Data is combined with neuromarketing to trigger
people subconsciously into buying commodities
(Dooley, 2012). Conscious interpellation is neglected
in order to ‘‘sell to [the pre-conscious] 95% of [the]
customer’s brain’’ (Dooley, 2012: 1).1
CDS hence requires a speciﬁc ontology to grasp these
pre-conscious forms of subjectivation. It should avoid
theories that take the individual and consciousness as
building blocks and look for approaches that bracket
the diﬀerences between humans and non-humans in
data practices in order to understand who the subjects
of Big Data are. In this paper I will focus on digital
subjectivation in ﬁnance, since between 50% and 70%
of all trades in equity markets are nowadays conducted
through computerized high-frequency trading
(Golumbia, 2013: 286), which undermines the assumed
subject–object distinction. These devices are more than
simple instruments (Pardo-Guerra, 2013: 134).
Computerized trading is conducted through the use of
algorithms that transform large datasets of information
into buying and selling commands. The research ques-
tion of this paper is consequently: what philosophical
outlook is the most advantageous to think critically
about digital subjectivation in ﬁnancial markets?
The approach of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) is
highly popular within CDS to analyse interactions
between human subjects and data (Boyd and
Crawford, 2012; Cavanagh, 2013; Dalton and
Thatcher, 2014; Lyon, 2014: 8; Ruppert, 2012). Some
ANT-researchers, such as Callon, MacKenzie, Knorr
Cetina, and Preda, have focused speciﬁcally on ﬁnance
(Vo¨llmer et al., 2009: 625) and constitute a movement
called ‘‘Social Studies of Finance’’ (SSF) (De Goede,
2005).2 Combining SSF with CDS to study digital sub-
jectivation in ﬁnancial markets thus seems a fruitful
decision (Pardo-Guerra, 2013). Both CDS and SSF
argue that non-human agents, like technologically
maintained datasets, are not simple representations of
reality, but active ‘‘producers of the real’’ (Kitchin,
2014: 23). This ﬁeld of research is mostly known for
its advocacy of the performativity of economics
(Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2008; MacKenzie et al.,
2007; Svetlova, 2012). According to SSF, economic the-
ories construct markets instead of simply representing
them. Financial data are not meaningful in their raw
state, but require theory to make sense of them. The
ﬁnancial economy is hence not a neutral testing ground
for economic theories, but the result of a battle between
diﬀerent performativities attempting to construct the
market (see infra). Both CDS and SSF consequently
have an interest in developing the performative aspects
of the discourses that organize information.
I will however argue that one should proceed with
caution when using SSF to develop critical theory.
ANT has frequently been linked to a ‘‘descriptive
turn’’ (Bryan et al., 2012: 305) and criticisms of its
lack of critical perspective are numerous (Fuller,
1999; Miller, 2002). That is why I will propose another
approach that shares ANT’s ontological commitments,
but adds a more clearly critical outlook, namely
Maurizio Lazzarato’s theory of machinic subjugation.3
My argument proceeds in ﬁve steps. Firstly I will
explain Lazzarato’s theory of machinic subjugation in
general. Secondly I will introduce SSF’s portrayal of
ﬁnancial markets. Thirdly, I will link both accounts to
a shared description of ﬁnancial machinic subjugation.
Afterwards I will show that SSF and Lazzarato can learn
from each other when it comes to criticizing ﬁnance.
Callon shows that the frames used to shape markets pro-
duce unintended consequences, but Lazzarato points to
three problems missing in the SSF analysis: (1) machinic
subjugation in ﬁnance leads to a lack of control and pol-
itical responsibility, (2) it obscures exploitation, since the
production of surplus value extends labour time to
whenever one performs actions relevant to market
prices, and (3) the ﬁnancial markets trump the possibi-
lities for resistance through the use of debt to keep popu-
lations submissive. Lastly I will show that SSF’s idea of
developing new performative ﬁnancial theories cannot
adequately address the criticisms Lazzarato levels
against ﬁnance. This will lead to Lazzarato’s approach
to resistance as existential pragmatics.
Lazzarato’s theory of subjectivation:
Social subjection and machinic
subjugation
According to Lazzarato, subjects are constituted
through two diﬀerent mechanisms: (1) social subjection
(assujettissement sociale) and (2) machinic subjugation
(asservissement machinique).4
1. Social subjection is Lazzarato’s equivalent
for Althusser’s theory of interpellation. Individual
identities are constructed in institutions through so-
called ‘signifying semiotics’ (Lazzarato, 2014: 39).
These are a range of discourses and representations
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aimed at individuals’ consciousness in order to iden-
tify them along the lines of binary categories (male/
female, employer/employee, debtor/creditor).
Signifying semiotics stabilize social roles within the
individual of whom certain behaviour is expected.
This is not necessarily a planned endeavour, but the
eﬀects remain the same. For instance, in Western
societies children learn that blue refers to boys and
pink to girls. There is nothing in the colours them-
selves that justiﬁes such a signiﬁcation, but it stabil-
izes the male/female-opposition, because this
dichotomy regulates an informal division of social
roles. It is only a conventional representation
people have learned to identify with.
Social subjection presupposes a ﬁrm distinction
between subjects and objects. Since signifying semi-
otics require consciousness as an addressee, only sub-
jects are the targets of signifying semiotics, while
objects are tools for instrumental use. It would be
ridiculous to expect male behaviour from blue toys
because their colour refers to masculinity. Only
human subjects are expected to behave according to
their social role, since only they can be consciously
addressed by signifying semiotics.
2. Apart from signifying semiotics, Lazzarato also
posits the existence of ‘asignifying semiotics’
(Lazzarato, 2014: 80). These are languages that do
not communicate representations to conscious indi-
viduals, but act directly on the real, such as the codes
of computer languages and microchips. This is
Kitchin’s Big Data as ‘‘producers of the real’’
(Kitchin, 2014: 23) or Cheney-Lippold’s ‘‘code as
architecture’’ (Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 166), which
regulates ﬂows of information on the Internet.
Asignifying semiotics do not represent ideas, but
issue commands to make the computer’s software
perform certain tasks. The ones and zeros of
binary code are not meaningful representations of
a reality outside the code, but directives for the pas-
sing or cutting of electrical currents. The eﬀect is not
the alteration of reality indirectly through individual
consciousness, but the usage of the appropriate ‘dia-
grams’ to change existence itself directly by mana-
ging the distribution of ﬂows like electrical currents.
Lazzarato use of the term ‘diagram’ refers to
Deleuze’s reading of Foucault (Deleuze, 2004: 79–
80). Deleuze argues that apart from discursive
power/knowledge, Foucault also posits the existence
of non-discursive power technologies like the panop-
ticon. The latter organize subjects according to par-
ticular schemes to make them subservient to the
goals of power. For instance, the play of visibility
and invisibility in the panopticon organizes the car-
ceral space to produce docile, disciplined bodies. A
ﬂow of unruly criminals is transformed through the
spatial organization of the prison into a queue of
docile citizens, without these subjects being aware
of the inﬂuence of space on their behaviour.
Lazzarato claims these asignifying semiotics per-
form machinic subjugation by pre-consciously
encapsulating individuals in a machinic assemblage.
For instance, a car driver does not consciously decide
how to act. The car does not demand the individual’s
whole mental investment, but instead uses those parts
of the driver’s body necessary for the act. Dashboard
signals stimulate automatic reactions from the driver.
The driver and the car merge into a single assemblage
of machinic parts connected to each other. The
opposition between subject and object is hence ren-
dered obsolete. The individual is not invested in the
process as a conscious whole, but instead some of his
body parts function as nodes of input and output to
make the human–machine work. The car as human–
machine is an assemblage of parts communicating
commands to each other through all kinds of asigni-
fying semiotics (electric currents, dashboard lights,
nervous impulses, muscular movements, etc.). Full
conscious investment is superﬂuous when the nodes
of the human–machine assemblage are well coordi-
nated. As long as nothing out of the ordinary dis-
rupts the coordination of ﬂows, consciousness does
not enter the process of driving.
Internet companies like Amazon.com give a
socially more relevant example (Terranova, 2010:
156). The algorithms that predict the costumer’s
behaviour run faster than the consumer’s nervous
system. This means that the computer knows the con-
sumer’s desires more quickly than the consumer her-
self. Amazon can even anticipate and shape this
demand with lists of recommended books. Buying
books on the Internet is thus not the activity of a
subjective agent on an instrumental object, since the
latter has just as much agency as the costumer in
forming her desires. Machinic subjugation is hence a
mechanism of subjectivation that disassembles the
individual into a multiplicity of machines that can
be made compatible to other machines to regulate
ﬂows while circumventing consciousness. Amazon
shapes digital consumer subjectivity by making the
eye and the brain compatible to a website in order
to translate ﬂows of product information into ﬂows
of attention and money.
SSF and the construction of
financial markets
Since the 2000s a number of sociologists, calling them-
selves SSF, have developed a similar picture of
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subjectivation to describe ﬁnancial markets. Their focus
is primarily on computer screen trading, because trad-
ing pits, where traders shout orders instead of using
computers, have declined in importance (Borch et al.,
2015: 8–11; Zaloom, 2010). The average trading room
consists of around 200 traders sitting at desks sur-
rounded by up to ﬁve computer screens each (Knorr
Cetina and Bruegger, 2002b: 393). All traders have their
eyes ﬁxed on their screens ready for the next purchase
or sale. These screens appresent informational data,
ranging from stock prices to Reuters news feeds
(Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002a: 163).5 Today tra-
ders own smartphones to access the market even out-
side their oﬃces.
Computer screen trading encourages SSF research-
ers to develop new models of ﬁnancial trading. For
them, markets are not natural spaces where fully
formed subjects meet and exchange goods (Callon,
1998: 8). Callon introduces the mechanism of ‘framing’
to account for the construction of markets (Callon,
1998: 16–23). In everyday interactions one rarely calcu-
lates monetary costs and beneﬁts, but follows certain
social norms and habits. Establishing a market however
necessitates that people are disentangled from their
non-economic relations and introduced to a new
frame that incentivizes them to calculate costs and
beneﬁts.6 Technologies help in shaping such a space.
For instance, Garcia-Parpet (2007: 20–53) has shown
how in French strawberry agriculture the building of
new auction houses has facilitated the emergence of a
network resembling a competitive market. While in the
1980s trade was conducted on the basis of personal
relationships between farmers and salespeople, after
the auctions were built, farmer–salesman relations
were rendered anonymous and prices were made
public, which made comparisons possible. This stimu-
lated farmers to act more on the basis of self-interest
instead of personal obligations. Technological devices
have transformed farmers into ‘‘calculative agencies’’
(Callon, 1998: 3) without them realizing it, just as the
panopticon did for prisoners, according to Foucault.
Even if the homo oeconomicus does not exist independ-
ently, technological framings construct a habitat where
people behave as if they were homines oeconomici.
The same mechanism of disentanglement and fram-
ing applies to ﬁnancial markets. These markets do not
exist naturally, but are products of technology. To
account for this construction SSF researchers posit
the performative character of economic theories.
Economics is not a camera representing the economy,
but an engine creating it (MacKenzie, 2008). They posit
two forms of performativity. Firstly economic theories
function as self-fulﬁlling prophecies (Callon, 2007: 321–
324). If a rating agency persuades investors that Greece
can no longer pay its debts, then interests on Greece’s
loans will go up to such an extent that eventually
Greece will really go bankrupt. Analogously to
Lazzarato’s social subjection, self-fulﬁlling prophecies
shape reality by hailing people’s consciousness and
making them act according to particular beliefs.
Callon (2007: 324–326) posits ‘prescription’ as a
second form of performativity. Instead of addressing
conscious individuals, economic theories can inform
the creation of technological devices. Options pricing
is, for instance, calculated with the Black-Scholes
model, which is a highly complex mathematical equa-
tion (MacKenzie, 2003). In order to facilitate its use
there are a number of online calculators where traders
can simply put in the data and receive the market
option price. Most traders cannot perform the calcula-
tions behind this formula independently and would
hence price options diﬀerently without it. These
online calculators have hence made themselves true,
because everyone relies on them.
The second form of performativity, prescription, is
for SSF the most important one. Thanks to techno-
logical devices ﬁnancial markets are ‘‘networks [. . .]
analogous with electric circuits’’ (Vo¨llmer et al., 2009:
621). Information ﬂows run along computers and
sometimes pass through human beings in order to be
transformed into money ﬂows. This network is regu-
lated through ‘‘signals [that] trigger a reaction in the
receiver, while being independent of the cognitive prop-
erties of the latter’’ (Vo¨llmer et al., 2009: 621). Just like
Lazzarato and his asignifying semiotics, SSF research-
ers believe that ﬁnancial markets are regulated through
signals that command traders to perform particular
forms of behaviour without addressing consciousness.
SSF abandons the subject–object distinction: traders
are completely immersed in the screen reality where
the human subject is no longer the sole agent, but
shares agency with computer algorithms. Traders
treat the market presented on the screen as a Greater
Life-Form (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002a: 168),
not as a simple piece of equipment. This greater being
is not an embodied presence one can talk or relate to,
but thanks to the responses it gives to individual
actions, traders can develop a ‘feeling for the market’
(Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002a: 179). Buying and
selling stocks are largely conducted on intuition and
split-second decisions where traders strike a connection
with the market through the interactions between
bodily movements and algorithms informed by eco-
nomic theories (Borch et al., 2015).
Describing financial machinic
subjugation with SSF and Lazzarato
There are some obvious similarities between Lazzarato
and SSF: both deny the subject–object distinction in
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order to grasp how technology contributes to digital
subjectivation without addressing the consciousness of
individuals. Asigniﬁying semiotics, or signals, organize
ﬂows of information, money, muscular impulses, etc. to
construct a human–machine assemblage, or network,
organized by diagrams, or performative economic the-
ories. In what follows, I apply Lazzarato’s theory of
machinic subjugation to SSF’s empirical ﬁndings on
ﬁnancial markets.
Before we start describing the ﬁnancial markets as
human-machine assemblages, it is however advisory to
state the goal of the assemblage. Lazzarato summarizes
ﬁnancial capital accumulation in a classical Marxist
vocabulary as the process of generating more money
from money (M-M’) (Lazzarato, 2015: 144). In a
technologically advanced market, proﬁt depends on
acceleration of trading interactions, because whoever
is the fastest has a time advantage over his competitors
(MacKenzie et al., 2012: 288).7 For instance, imagine a
pension fund wants to sell a large part of its stocks in a
particular company. It makes the order, and two sec-
onds later the stocks are sold. This action makes the
price go down, because the supply goes up. A high fre-
quency trader can see and sell his own stocks within
these two seconds and buy them again afterwards when
the price is lower. He has hence generated a secure
proﬁt simply thanks to his velocity.
Accelerating markets struggle with the limited
amount of information human brains can process and
therefore require computers and software devices
(MacKenzie, 2009: 13–16, 2015: 663). Attention is a
limited resource (Berardi, 97), so if the market wishes
to accelerate, it must ﬁnd ways to eﬃcaciously allocate
these scarce amounts of attention. This can be done
either by fuelling traders with Prozac and other drugs
(Berardi, 2015: 54), or by making transactions easier for
the brain to process with computer software. It does
not matter whether the trader understands or even
believes in the devices he is using, as long as they
work. Many traders do not grasp how the Black-
Scholes formula or ‘base correlations’ work, but that
is not necessary. The software at their disposal enables
them to achieve desired outcomes despite conscious
representations.8
The end result of this machinic subjugation is a net-
work of ﬂows (muscular movements, nervous impulses,
electric currents, etc.) channelled through circuits that
can select, distribute and transform these disparate
ﬂows into money-ﬂows. If ﬁnancial traders experience
a ‘feeling for the market’ that they cannot explicitly
describe, they are successfully machinically subjugated
to the ﬁnancial assemblage. Their actions at the com-
puter screen distribute and select ﬂows of money in
order to generate proﬁts, and the screens produce sig-
nals that aﬀect the brain directly to make split-second
decisions. The immersion described by SSF therefore
results from the construction of a machinic assemblage
where electric ﬂows serve as inputs into the nervous
system and nervous impulses are inputs to the com-
puter software.
In this network, the ﬁnancial trader becomes an
assemblage of multiple bodily functions and character-
istics shaping, and being shaped by, his environment.
He is a vessel of nervous, hormonal and muscular cir-
cuits that respond to stimuli. For instance, some
researchers study the trader’s body through the prism
of testosterone levels as an indicator of performance
(Terranova, 2010: 164). It turns out that traders who
regularly visit prostitutes consequently have higher tes-
tosterone levels and outperform other traders. Even
sexual inputs can therefore translate into monetary
outputs.
Because traders cannot know all market data
exhaustively, they are positioned in a state of preinfor-
mation, where information is ready at hand, and only
the immediately necessary is displayed on the screen
(Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002c: 942). One of the
most remarkable examples of this state of preinforma-
tion is the so-called ‘broker’s ear’ (MacKenzie, 2009:
12). During their own trades, dealers are able to simul-
taneously overhear telephone conversations of other
traders. Traders acquire the skill to select auditive
ﬂows according to monetary needs while listening to
multiple ﬂows of information at once, selecting and
connecting data.
The computers and telephones at the dealer’s desk
are therefore not mere instruments, but active agents in
the assemblage. They select and translate the informa-
tion the trader needs in order to make instantaneous
decisions. They shape the trader’s preferences through
transmission.9 A trader’s preference is not the result of
a conscious deliberation, as mainstream economics
believes, but the eﬀect of a multitude of stimuli pene-
trating the trader’s senses and interacting with his
brain. Only by opening up for these stimuli and by
developing the right circuits to deal with them, does
the trader learn to ‘feel the market’. This is not to say
that ﬁnancial traders lack agency completely. A trader
who bases his actions too conﬁdently on his fact
sheets is called a ‘sheet monkey’ by his co-workers
(MacKenzie, 2009: 21). A certain amount of creativity
is thus expected. Furthermore each ﬁnancial interaction
is a situational encounter for which there are no general
or pre-established rules (Preda, 2009a: 679–680).
Unpredictability is inscribed in the assemblage and con-
sequently hinders the formation of stringent habits.
Each node in the system autonomously decides which
ﬂows to cut, which to pass, where to pass them, and
how they should be translated into other ﬂows. Every
step in the machinic assemblage shapes future
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possibilities within the network. Just as the trader lacks
full control over what happens inside the computer
black box, the latter lacks complete control over the
trader’s decisions.
Traders even converse with each other through
asignifying semiotics. Their conversations do not estab-
lish communities of meaning, but ﬂows of information
and commands. They communicate through heavily
coded electronic messages. The results are cryptic, min-
imalist messages that issue commands instead of con-
veying meaningful messages. An example of such a
conversation is the following (Knorr Cetina and
Bruegger, 2002c: 933):
1. FROM GB4L GB4NY GLOB SPOT LDN *
0923GMT 251196 */3377
2. Our Terminal: GBIZ Our user: <name of spot
dealer>
3. CHF 10 PLS
4. # <InSD>6267
5. 67
6. # 10 MIO AGREED
7. # VAL 27NOV96
8. # MY CHF TO DIRECT
9. # THANKS AND BYE
10. # #INTERRUPT#
11. #
12. # #END LOCAL#
This message purportedly describes the purchase of
10 million Swiss Francs for US Dollars, but it is clear
that this is not a language for poetry. It is stripped of all
superﬂuous representations in order to reach the essen-
tials of the transaction. In the end the messages are
nothing more than codiﬁcations to command other
actors in the assemblage to exchange certain ﬂows for
others.
Instead of human control over ﬁnancial develop-
ments, the organization of machinic assemblages
depends on diagrams, i.e. rudimentary schemes that
organize the diﬀerent circuits of the assemblage. Just
as Foucault’s panoptical diagram distributed ﬂows of
prisoners in order to make docile bodies, ﬁnancial dia-
grams coordinate human and non-human actors to
process data in order to accumulate money. The com-
puters and humans making up the network are the
nodes where ﬂows are distributed and selected.
The diagrams install rules of conduct, both for the
computers and the people involved. For both, the main
challenge is how to avoid ‘overheating’ (MacKenzie,
2009: 17). Some calculations are so energy-consuming
for computers that they risk going up in ﬂames, espe-
cially in densely populated cities like London, which
lack adequate space. Computers are packed in ware-
houses where they lack suitable room to cool oﬀ.
Consequently they are selected on the basis of their
‘performance per watt’ and technological constrains
are put in place to prevent information overload. This
conundrum applies analogously to human brains
(Berardi, 2012: 68). The brain’s capacity to process
information is limited, so rules of conduct ensure its
smooth operation. The main function of diagrams is
therefore ‘‘easiﬁcation’’ (Berardi, 2012: 100). One
example is the informal ‘no odd eights rule’ in security
sales. Until 1997 stock prices were designated in eighths
of dollars, so a stock price could be $32 and 2/8.
Traders who used odd eights (1/8, 3/8, 5/8, or 7/8) how-
ever were rebuked by their colleagues. Odd eights
proved too complicated for the brain to handle on a
regular basis, and so it was informally decided not to
use them.10
Diagrams do not have to augment or facilitate cog-
nition, but they need to block the threat of contagion
(Lazzarato, 2014: 99). Flows infect machinic assem-
blages and spread to other assemblages without passing
through cognitive, conscious deliberation (Lazzarato,
2004: 112–115). The ‘thinking’ is outsourced to com-
puters and algorithms calculating the costs and beneﬁts
of transactions, but algorithms can be naive (Arnoldi,
2016). They use formulae without critically reﬂecting
whether the assumption of these formulae apply. This
situation stimulates uncritical imitation. A conversa-
tion between a dealer and his client can instantaneously
circulate to other traders or become an element show-
ing up on the newsfeed in the computer. The eventual
product of all these contagious actions should be a
stable market, but this stability depends on the
existence of the aforementioned diagrams regulating
communications. This is not a ﬁxed guarantee (Vogl,
2015), since these diagrams are not ﬁxed laws
but mostly informal guidelines. If many people sud-
denly buy a particular kind of stock, this might infect
other ﬁnancial assemblages, even if there is no good
reason for valuing that stock more than before.
Eventually everyone starts buying, and ﬁnancial bub-
bles are created. The same dynamic fosters panic and
chaos in cases where someone starts selling (Marazzi,
2008: 128).11
We can summarize the application to ﬁnancial tra-
ders of Lazzarato’s theory of digital subjectivation as
machinic subjugation as follows. Traders and com-
puters are equally mobilized to generate ﬁnancial prof-
its. Both are determined by the stimuli coming from
other nodes in the assemblage, while they also autono-
mously and creatively select and transform these sti-
muli. The ﬁnancial trader is hence nothing more than
a bundle of circuits to distribute ﬂows of money, elec-
tricity, testosterone, etc. The communication between
diﬀerent elements in the assemblage does not occur
through conscious representations, but through
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asignifying semiotics. The human brain cannot keep up
in an accelerated market, so some of its activities are
outsourced to computers. The communication of men
and computers is contagiously organized through dia-
grams of predetermined rules of conduct to hinder the
overheating of the assemblage by imposing standar-
dized schemes for how to select and distribute ﬂows.
Criticizing finance beyond SSF
Up to this point SSF has elaborated similar descrip-
tions of ﬁnancial markets, but it is remarkably less crit-
ical than Lazzarato’s reading of ﬁnance. ‘‘Although
[SSF] has provided vivid accounts of the inner life of
ﬁnancial markets, their self-proclaimed view that they
provide a better insight into how ﬁnancial markets and
the involved actors work, think and act [. . .] is over-
stated’’ (Lilley and Papadopoulos, 2014: 980). SSF
describes ﬁnance from a neutral perspective as if there
is no political stake involved. Discussions of power and
legitimacy are consequently absent from the works of
MacKenzie or Knorr Cetina (Golumbia, 2013). Even
when MacKenzie et al. explicitly mention legitimacy
(2012: 288–291), they reduce this question to citing a
debate among traders and economists about whether
high-frequency trading is fair to other companies and
ensures market stability. They do not touch upon
broader legitimacy issues. Similarly Callon (1998: 45)
mentions the existence of unequal calculating capaci-
ties, but denies the possibility of overcoming this
inequality. A third telling example is Pardo-Guerra,
who promises ‘‘a critical reassessment of ﬁnance’’
(2013: 131), but afterwards only argues that ﬁnance is
not as disembodied or lacking in spatial conﬁgurations
as sociologists tend to suggest. This constitutes a cri-
tique of the sociology of ﬁnance, but not of ﬁnance
itself.
A more charitable reading of SSF points to Callon’s
conception of overﬂowing (1998: 16–18, 244–269).12
Framing entails the construction of a network built
on speciﬁc, calculative relations. ‘‘[It] establishes a
boundary within which interactions [. . .] take place
more or less independently of their surrounding con-
text’’ (Callon, 1998: 249).13 This necessitates the disen-
tanglement of non-economic relations, but some of
these resist the frame. People for instance disentangle
trees from their role in the planetary ecosystem as neu-
tralizers of greenhouse gasses in order to cut them
down and refabricate them as tables or chairs.
However, this disentanglement remains incomplete,
since the role of trees in the environment cannot be
suspended. Environmental deterioration is hence the
result of an unsuccessful framing attempt. The current
economic frame has failed to mobilize its network to
avoid all unintentional consequences. According to
Callon (1998: 252), all frames require extensive work
to keep the market together and not succumb to over-
ﬂowing. The solution, for Callon, is to reframe the
economy to include these overﬂowing relations. One
could, for instance, impose a tax on cutting trees.
That would oblige businesses to include the environ-
mental costs in their calculations.
Callon’s critique makes a poignant observation not
explicitly formulated in Lazzarato’s evaluation of
ﬁnance. There are however two problems if the critique
of ﬁnance stops at this level. Firstly, we should ask
ourselves whether Callon is really introducing some-
thing new. He mentions himself that his concept of
overﬂowing is identical to the economic concept of
externality (Callon, 1998: 17). Economists already
know that economic actions have unpredictable side
eﬀects and that these should be included into theory
as much as possible (Callon, 1998: 251). It is conse-
quently unclear what Callon’s approach would add to
the existing reform proposals.
More importantly however the call for experimenta-
tion runs counter to most other critiques of ﬁnance.
Most commentators argue that a key factor in the
volatility of ﬁnance is its ungovernability through
complexity (Engelen et al., 2012: 367–368).
Experimentation and bricolage is part of ﬁnance’s
DNA.14 Devices like excessively complex derivatives
and collateralized debt obligations are responsible for
ﬁnance’s ungovernability. It is therefore hard to see
how theoretical bricolage would help to avoid future
crises. Callon’s call for reframing to include overﬂow-
ing relations is hence essentially more of the same
instead of a real break with existing practices.15
Callon lacks a criterion that would select new frames
that are less, instead of more, risky than the previous
ones.
Lazzarato’s approach to ﬁnancial traders’ behaviour
allows us to construct a more far-reaching critique of
ﬁnancial markets. The problem is threefold: (1) machi-
nic subjugation makes markets slip out of conscious
control and depersonalizes power relations to the
extent that no individual can be held responsible for
market failures, (2) it obscures exploitation, since the
production of surplus value extends labour time
to whenever one generates ﬁnancial proﬁt, and (3) the
ﬁnancial markets promote an undemocratic politics of
the possible and trump the possibilities for resistance or
reform through the use of debt.
1. When computers conduct most of the actual trading,
humans tend to lose control over their own creation
(Lazzarato, 2014: 96). Classical economics makes us
believe traders are rational homines oeconomici cal-
culating their own private interests and promoting,
through the invisible hand of the market, the general
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good. Machinic subjugation however demonstrates
that large parts of the decision-making process are
outsourced to computers. Due to the so-called ‘auto-
mation bias’ (Pasquale, 2015: 107), people tend to
think that computerized trading is more successful
than human agency, because the former is faster and
smarter than humans. However, this view obscures
the fact that, just like human beings, computerized
algorithms work on the basis of assumptions that
may not always hold (Arnoldi, 2016). A good exam-
ple of this problem is the Flash Crash of the 6 May
2010. Algorithms make assumptions about the
market, but when something unexpected happens,
nobody knows how they will react. In a matter of
a few minutes stock prices unexpectedly collapsed,
only to recover during the next couple of minutes
(MacKenzie, 2015: 646–647). Although high-fre-
quency trading was itself not the root cause, it con-
tributed to the market volatility that made the crash
so dramatic (Kirilenko et al., 2010). ‘‘Traders had
programmed split-second algorithmic strategies to
gain a competitive edge, but soon found themselves
in the position of a sorcerer’s apprentice, unable to
control the technology they had developed’’
(Pasquale, 2015: 131).
When the market crashes, power relations are
depoliticized and depersonalized (Lazzarato, 2014:
41). For purposes of acceleration, agency was
divested from conscious individuals and conferred
to human–machine assemblages through machinic
subjugation. The digital subjectivation of traders
hence leads to a lack of political responsibility
during crises. The greed of ﬁnancial traders is too
simple a criticism, since each particular individual
can justiﬁably shift the blame elsewhere, because he
is not personally responsible. Conscious individual
decisions are not the cause of ﬁnancial crises.
Rather, the whole human–machine assemblage is to
blame. The legal system demands personal responsi-
bility, but human actors lost this capacity by connect-
ing their brains to the ﬁnancial assemblage. Some
market developments are beyond conscious human
control. In the end ‘the system’ did it, i.e. the accel-
erating ﬁnancial assemblage of human brains and
computer algorithms.
Does this mean we should destroy all the
machines and return to a more human form of
ﬁnance? According to Lazzarato (2015: 203–204),
Luddism would not constitute a viable solution.
Technological machines in themselves are morally
neutral, but everything depends on the ‘social
machine’ in which they are embedded. Machinic
subjugation in itself is unavoidable, but one should
pay attention to what kinds of subjectivation it pro-
motes. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with pre-
consciously driving a car, but Lazzarato objects to
outsourcing crucial parts of the economy to human–
machine assemblages, because the consequences are
sometimes catastrophic for large sections of the
population.
2. Machinic subjugation facilitates exploitation by
obfuscating the borders between labour and produc-
tion (Lazzarato, 2014: 43–46). The ﬁrst is the human
activity of generating commodities in exchange for a
wage, while the second denotes all processes that
generate surplus value. Production is hence broader
than the labour people are actually paid for
(Lazzarato, 2015: 193).16 The business model of
Internet companies like Amazon.com frequently
exploits the invisible nature of this distinction
(Tene and Polonetsky, 2013: 254–255). Consumers’
machinically subjugated behaviour on the Internet
produces data Amazon appropriates to maximize its
proﬁts and augment its market value. Amazon is
accumulating proﬁt from its clients’ production of
data. Buying a book on the web is hence performing
unwaged work for Internet companies.17
We can even make a more radical argument. As
one of Knorr Cetina’s and Bruegger’s interviewees
says: ‘‘What central banks are doing, what the large
funds are doing, what the press is saying, what’s hap-
pening to the CDU, what the Malaysian prime min-
ister is saying, [the market] is everything’’ (Knorr
Cetina and Bruegger, 2002a: 168). Every piece of
information can become an input to the ﬁnancial
system and hence generate proﬁts. When environ-
mental activists protest against a polluting company,
they are not only performing a political action, but
they are also indirectly generating proﬁts for ﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms speculating on that company’s stock value
going down. The ﬁnancial assemblage exploits the
creative cooperation of brains by capturing these
activities within the ﬁnancial machine (Lazzarato,
2004: 142). As ironical as it might seem, this mech-
anism allows for the incorporation of anticapitalist
forms of protest into the ﬁnancial assemblage as a
resource for proﬁts.
3. If we identify democracy with the idea that those sub-
jected to the law should also be its makers (Kalyvas,
2005: 238), then the ﬁnancial politics of the possible is
undemocratic. Since states and populations depend
on ﬁnancial markets for their sustenance, the latter
acquire the ﬁnal decision over the goals and projects
of societies. ‘‘We do not have the right to participate
in the construction of worlds, the elaboration of prob-
lems and the invention of their solutions, outside of
the already established alternatives’’ (Lazzarato,
2004: 98, my translation). Financial markets and
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rating agencies hold the power to decide which polit-
ical communities can exist and which are ‘ economic-
ally unfeasible’. ‘‘The hegemony of neoliberal life
appears to foreclose the possibility of any alternative
mode of existence’’ (Kiersey, 2011: 36). Since the goal
of ﬁnancial markets is accumulation of capital, there
is a bias within this politics of the possible toward the
stimulation of ﬁnancially proﬁtable behaviour and
the deterrence of non-proﬁtable endeavours. Even
though a university might value the humanities for
their own sake, ﬁnancial imperatives might oblige it
to cut the humanities’ budget in order to stay com-
petitive in the university market. Economic consider-
ations might eventually have the ﬁnal decision-
making authority in domains like education, where
people would not necessarily want ﬁnancial terms to
deﬁne the debate.18
The reason why ﬁnancial markets are able to
determine the viability of lifestyles is because most
individuals and governments are indebted and
therefore need a ‘creditworthy’ reputation
(Lazzarato, 2012). As the welfare state declined
during the 1980s, access to credit was facilitated in
order to sustain high consumption, avoid overpro-
duction and stimulate economic growth (Lucarelli,
2010: 125). For Lazzarato, debt is not an obligation
emerging from a contract between free and equal
individuals, but is from the start an unequal power
relation where the creditor can assert his force over
the debtor. As long as he is indebted, the latter’s
rights are virtually suspended (Lazzarato, 2015:
66).19 For instance, a debtor’s property rights can
be superseded when he fails to reimburse the creditor
by evicting him from his home or selling his property
at a public auction.20 State violence is called upon to
force non-creditworthy individuals to comply
(Lazzarato, 2015: 95). We should not even jump to
these extreme cases of state enforcement to see that
debt entails a disequilibrium of power. Even the
peaceful house loan harbours a concentration of
risk on the side of the debtor (Mian and Suﬁ,
2015). When I take a $100.000 loan for a house
that, during an economic crisis, loses its value,
I still have to pay $100.000 plus interests to the
bank. The risk of a housing crash is shifted to the
debtor’s side of the bargain. During a ﬁnancial crisis
this risk concentration makes it possible for the cred-
itors to demand a change of lifestyle from the debtor,
without the former having to reform themselves.
Entering into a dialogue with finance
The presented image of the ﬁnancial system is ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, it seems like there is no escape
from ﬁnance. Every opposition can be integrated into
the ﬁnancial assemblage (Guattari, 2011: 27). On the
other hand, the ﬁnancial markets are fragile: the assem-
blage balances on a precarious set of diagrams organiz-
ing ﬁnancial ﬂows. Joris Luyendijk (2015), a Dutch
journalist, adequately portrays the ﬁnancial system by
comparing it to an airplane during turbulence with the
pilot missing: no one is in control and the markets are
increasingly volatile. SSF researchers link this instabil-
ity to the contingency of performativity and overﬂow-
ing. Markets are organized through economic theories
that shape networks by prescribing people to act as if
they were homines oeconomici. This prescriptive perfor-
mativity depends on the use of technological devices to
install the conditions of possibility of subjectivation.
A trader can only become a node in a stream of ﬁnan-
cial information thanks to the electric circuits that show
him the market on a computer screen, the servers that
calculate the options pricing using the Black-Scholes
formula, the electronic messaging system that lets
them communicate swiftly, etc. Prescription is however
never complete, since there are always unintended side
eﬀects overﬂowing the frame.
For SSF repoliticizing ﬁnance means opening up the
black boxes of ﬁnance and developing new theories to
perform the market diﬀerently (De Goede, 2005). SSF
envisions economics as a ‘‘Kampfplatz of contesting
performativities’’ (Bryan et al., 2012: 307).
Mainstream economics can thus be replaced with new
performativities, for instance stemming from heterodox
economics that frame the market diﬀerently. ‘‘Our
work, together with the actors, is to multiply possible
worlds through collective experimentations and perfor-
mations’’ (Callon, 2007: 352). Lazzarato is however
suspicious of theories of resistance based on performa-
tivity because these approaches tend to suﬀer from a
democratic deﬁcit. ‘‘The performative [. . .] is always
more or less strictly institutionalized such that its ‘con-
ditions’ as well as its ‘eﬀects’ are known in advance’’
(Lazzarato, 2014: 173). A performative utterance only
works when the conditions of felicity are met, which
means, among other things, that the speaker must
already possess the authority to persuade others (self-
fulﬁlling prophecy) or to determine the make-up of
market technologies (prescription). This authority how-
ever relies on past power relations and hence fails to
introduce a radical rupture in ﬁnance. That is why
Callon only mentions engineers, accountants, mar-
keters and market professionals as possible agents of
new framings (Callon, 2007: 332–333), while
MacKenzie only proposes mild reforms, such as
better market models built from the bottom up and
more attention to the gaps in evaluation procedures
(Engelen et al., 2012: 364). SSF focuses on economic
professionals to articulate contesting performativities
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because the latter have the authority to ﬁrmly establish
new framings. Ordinary people lack this authority and
are hence deprived of the primary means of
resistance.21
Lazzarato takes another route, not focusing on lin-
guistic performativity, but on the existential attitudes
assumed towards speech acts. According to Lazzarato
(2014: 178–182), all language is dialogic: every
utterance awaits a response, but cannot completely
determine what the response will be. The audience
remains free to determine its attitude toward the ori-
ginal utterance. For instance, I can say to a friend
‘‘What a lovely day outside’’ expecting to start a mun-
dane conversation, but I cannot guarantee that my
friend will pick up on this invitation. He might
answer with philosophical murmurings about the onto-
logical status of the weather. Ruptures consequently
occur in the attitudes assumed toward speech acts,
not in the speech acts themselves. When discussing
speech acts, Lazzarato therefore distinguishes between
their linguistic aspects and their ‘‘existential prag-
matics’’ (2014: 205). Each utterance contains a linguis-
tic meaning and an attitude towards that meaning.
When I say ‘‘What a lovely day outside’’ I do not just
describe the weather, but I also position myself opti-
mistically toward my current situation. The self is con-
structed primarily through the self-positioning attitudes
towards speech acts, which leaves room for disrupting
dominant meanings. For example, the rules of seman-
tics and grammar might set the stage for what can be
said or not, but the individual writer still retains the
freedom to develop his own writing style. As in the
case of Rainer Maria Rilke’s poem about the archaic
torso of Apollo, this writing style can even break the
rules in order to make new experiences expressible. We
all know that an archaic bust cannot look at us, espe-
cially when its head is severed. But Rilke opens up new
experiences for linguistic expression by writing that the
gaze of the statue compels us to change our lives. By
playing with the rules of language, poetry can unravel
new forms of existence.
In contexts of power, speech acts are only capable of
setting the stage without determining the response.
Although the speaker’s authority is a necessary condi-
tion for a successful speech act, existential pragmatics
guarantees that it is not a suﬃcient condition.
Authoritative ﬁgures make ‘‘representative claims’’
(Saward, 2010) about society, ﬁnance, the economy,
etc., but the public’s reactions are fundamentally unpre-
dictable. Protest movements cultivate an existential
pragmatics of refusal to reject the speaker’s representa-
tive claims, even if they meet all conditions of felicity.
Political authorities’ speech acts are contestable, and
opposition to the dominant discourses opens up new
ways to represent society. This was the inspiration
behind a number of mass movements after the
Financial Crisis, such as Occupy Wall Street, the
Indignados and Syriza – or earlier the anti-globalisa-
tion movement of Seattle (Lazzarato, 2004: 10). Instead
of representing austerity as a necessary instrument for
the government’s ﬁnancial health, they rearticulated it
as a technique to consolidate inequality. This opens up
new routes for action invisible to the dominant narra-
tive (Lilley and Papadopoulos, 2014: 981–984), such as
debt relief or healthcare reform. Which discourse is
eventually hegemonic, depends on the public’s
responses to both utterances. Everyone is free to deter-
mine one’s own existential attitudes toward the repre-
sentative claims of opposing factions, but where speech
act theory in itself assumes power inequalities,
Lazzarato’s addition of existential pragmatics intro-
duces a resource equally available to all speakers. The
authority of the speaker can never completely deter-
mine the public’s response because existential prag-
matics makes each speech act dialogic.
These examples however stay in the realm of signify-
ing semiotics. They propose new representations of soci-
ety and the economy addressed to consciousness,
whereas in the case of ﬁnancial markets we have seen
that asignifying semiotics are of paramount import-
ance. This partly explains the lack of success of the
aforementioned protest movements. They were unable
to reform the ﬁnancial sector, because they do not
speak the language this sector speaks. The ﬁnancial
machine can run independently of the representations
of outsiders. Is there consequently a possibility for
asignifying resistant existential pragmatics? Can the
ﬁnancial assemblage be disrupted on an algorithmic
level in order to create new forms of existence?
Initiatives like the Yes Men provide examples of
non-representational resistance through asignifying
semiotics (Terranova, 2010: 166–170). The Yes Men
are a protest movement that falsely pose as representa-
tives of major ﬁrms and governments by making fake
websites, spreading sham petitions, attending business
conferences, etc. They feed the ﬁnancial assemblage
badly cooked data by generating false news about mor-
ally questionable company and government policies in
order to make stock prices go down. For instance, in
2004 they feigned to represent Dow Chemical at a con-
ference where they said the ﬁrm would compensate the
victims of an environmental disaster caused by Dow
Chemical in Bhopal for $12 billion. This news sounded
so ominous to investors that the stock prices of Dow
Chemical fell by 4.24% on the Frankfurt stock
exchange (CNN, 2004).
These actions constitute not a competing represen-
tative claim about the economy, but an asignifying
input that disrupts the ﬁnancial assemblage. Once the
Dow Chemical headline appears on the traders’ screens,
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it sets in motion a contagious ﬂow that shocks the
whole ﬁnancial market. This opens up new existential
possibilities as the Yes Men construct a new identity by
positioning themselves against the ﬁnancial machine.
They do not wish to become a part of it or redistribute
its proﬁts more equally, but they endeavour to create
existences that the ﬁnancial assemblage no longer dares
to capture. Just as the Greek cynics’ critique of ancient
society was not aimed at unravelling the theoretically
true representation of society, but at ﬁnding a truthful
way of life (Lazzarato, 2014: 236–237), the Yes Men’s
actions oﬀend the contemporary powers in order to
ﬁnd ways of life beyond ﬁnance.
Conclusion
It might seem as if ﬁnancial traders act as conscious
subjects determining their private interest, but in reality
their behaviour is predetermined by pre-conscious
forms of machinic subjugation. They use their com-
puter just as much as their computers use them. Both
communicate through asignifying commands that regu-
late ﬂows of money, testosterone, electricity, etc. in
order to generate proﬁt. What philosophical outlook
is in such a context the most advantageous to think
critically about digital subjectivation in ﬁnancial mar-
kets? Although SSF is quite popular within CDS, it has
only revealed this pre-conscious aspect of ﬁnancial mar-
kets without developing a convincing critique or theory
of resistance. SSF argues that overﬂowing is the main
obstacle for contemporary ﬁnance and that the con-
struction of new performative frames is the key to
reform. It is however unclear how this proposal can
limit ﬁnance’s tendency toward complexity or democ-
ratize ﬁnance’s politics of the possible. Lazzarato’s
framework raises a number of new concerns: machinic
subjugation diverts political responsibility away from
traders, sometimes with catastrophic consequences; it
obstructs escape attempts from the ﬁnancial system
by turning even oppositional actions into productive
resources for ﬁnancial proﬁts, even though the subjects
who performed the work are not compensated for this
wealth-production; lastly, ﬁnancial markets determine
which future worlds are possible and which are ‘unfeas-
ible’ given the current economic conditions. This limits
democratic participation and is sustained through debt.
Lazzarato overcomes the democratic deﬁcit implicit in
SSF’s theory of resistance as contesting performativities
by focusing on existential pragmatics. Since the ﬁnan-
cial sector runs primarily on asignifying semiotics and
every utterance leaves room for free existential self-
positionings thanks to the dialogic nature of language,
the ﬁnancial assemblage can be destabilized by feeding
false inputs into the ﬁnancial assemblage in order to
open up possibilities for new ways of life.
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Notes
1. These recent developments follow from neurological
experiments that show that the brain makes decisions
even before one is consciously aware of them. Brain
scans show that, when given a puzzle, an individual’s
brain solves it eight seconds ahead of the individual’s con-
scious decision-making (Dooley, 2012: 1).
2. For an introduction to SSF, see Callon (1998, 2007: 311–
354), De Goede (2005) and Vo¨llmer et al. (2009).
3. With this debate between SSF and Lazzarato I do not wish
to close off other approaches to digital subjectivation.
Deborah Lupton (2016) has, for instance, referred to
Donna Haraway’s cyborg metaphor and Annemarie
Mol’s body multiple to conceptualize digital subjectivation
and its political implications. I will not comment on these
perspectives since they are not immediately relevant to the
debate concerning financial digital subjectivation.
4. The term ‘enslavement’ (asservissement) is a bit harsh,
given the examples Lazzarato discusses, such as driving a
car (Lazzarato, 2014: 89). He borrows the concept how-
ever from Deleuze’s and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus,
where it makes more sense (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980:
528–592). For them, machinic subjugation refers first of all
to actual slaves in the imperial state. They were cogs in the
‘megamachine’ of the state, and this system returns today
as technology encapsulates human beings.
5. Knorr Cetina and Bruegger get the concept of ‘appresen-
tation’ from phenomenology. They argue that computer
screens don’t represent a market already in existence, but
constitute it by gathering the disparate data and configur-
ing them into one unified whole.
6. Framing is however always incomplete. That is why Callon
stresses the phenomenon of overflowing (see infra), or
what economists call ‘externalities’ (Callon, 1998: 244–
269). Some relations defy the frame imposed on them
and hence remain outside the frame, even though they
can have tremendous effects. For instance, the environ-
mental impact of consumption is not explicitly part of
the dominant economic theories and yet its importance is
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incontestable. In Callon’s vocabulary, environmental
relations overflow the dominant frame. According to
SSF researchers, the main way to account for these
forces of overflowing is by rearranging the frame in
order to include these overflowing relations. One could,
for instance, impose a tax on environmental impact,
which would include the environment in business
accounting frames.
7. Hardin and Rottinghaus (2015) argue that the basis of
profit is hence ‘network differentials’. If any market par-
ticipant is temporally faster or spatially closer to the
market, she has a competitive edge over others. This is,
for instance, why companies practice ‘co-location’, i.e.
renting buildings next to the trading venue in order to
minimize the time-lapse between the order and the
exchange.
8. The more developed this software becomes, the more its
owner gets an information advantage over others
(Pasquale, 2015: 130). Since these algorithms are not
made public, it is hard to get into the financial business
without insider information. This problem is not solely
confined to finance, but bothers the whole Big Data
industry (Boyd and Crawford, 2012: 673–674).
9. In the ANT-vocabulary, we would say that the computer
screens function not as intermediaries, but as mediators
(Jerolmack and Tavory, 2014: 66). The screens do not
perfectly represent the original stream of data, but trans-
form the data in the process of translation. The software
algorithms make assumptions about how the different
stimuli are connected and reflect not just the data, but
also these assumptions.
10. A more colourful example is the success of the Korean
Hangul writing system in digital technology (Berardi,
2015: 191). It is a mostly phonetic alphabet invented in
15th-century Korea. Thanks to its similar number of con-
sonants and vowels, and its eight basic letters, it is very
easy to use and makes digital communication faster.
‘‘Koreans type faster on Hangul keyboards, on average,
than Westerners who use English keyboards. It was no
accident that, in January of 2010, a team of two young
Koreans beat 24 other competitors from twelve countries
in the LGMobile Worldcup [sic], an international contest
to see who could input text fastest on a cell phone’’ (Oh
and Larson, 2011: 19).
11. As brains and machines become more intertwined
through financial assemblages and immaterial labour,
the psychopathological metaphors to describe financial
markets (depression, irrational exuberance, mania, etc.)
become more than simple metaphors. According to
Berardi (2012) markets start to exhibit the kind of pathol-
ogies we normally only find in deranged individuals.
Conversely, digital protocols start affecting the social
brain and infect individuals with new kinds of diseases.
The psychosphere is polluted by semiotic flows that deter-
ritorialize the meanings that structure human lives
(Berardi, 2012: 120; Lazzarato, 2004: 149).
12. Bryan et al. (2012: 307) mention MacKenzie’s notion of
counterperformativity as a critique of finance. Actions
conducted on the basis of a particular economic theory
can make this theory less instead of more true
(MacKenzie, 2008: 259–260). Economic models such as
the Black-Scholes equation have assumptions and the
widespread use of these models sometimes undermine
these assumptions. This is, for instance, what happened,
according to MacKenzie (2008), in the 1987 financial
crash. Portfolio insurances based on the Black-Scholes
formula assumed only mild randomness of price move-
ments. Because everyone was so convinced of this, price
movements fluctuated much more randomly than
expected. If people had not used Black-Scholes-informed
computers, the crash would have been less severe.
MacKenzie however does not connect any negative evalu-
ation of finance or mainstream economic theories to this
phenomenon. I would therefore claim that it is not
MacKenzie’s intention to criticize finance with this con-
cept. Counterperformativity only serves as an explana-
tory factor for unexpected financial troubles.
13. Callon (1998: 249–250) takes the concept of ‘frame’ from
Erving Goffman, who uses a stage performance as para-
digmatic example to explain framing. According to
Goffman, to make a stage play understandable a series
of interconnected expectations must be constructed. The
spectators must know that they should not call the police
when Othello murders Desdemona or the actors playing
Vladimir and Estragon must not wallow in despair when
Godot has still not arrived after weeks of performances.
The bracketing of the outside world presupposes the
drawing of boundaries between the world of the play
and the rest of the world. The frame is the set of assump-
tions that makes this distinction possible. Similarly eco-
nomics constructs a separate space where different rules
apply. Everyday interactions might function on the basis
of personal relationships, but economics delimits a space
framed by economic rules of cost–benefit calculations
instead.
14. Engelen et al. (2012: 364–366) use Le´vi-Strauss’ concept
of bricolage to make sense of the recurring tendency
toward unexpected financial crises. Government over-
sight has become increasingly impractical because finan-
cial innovation is largely improvised and differentiated
through multiple trading strategies. In such a context
every government intervention simply becomes a new
opportunity to improvise and to find new loopholes.
Patterson (2013: 49–58) provides a good example of this
phenomenon. When the US government’s Securities and
Exchange Commission launched the Regulation National
Market System to link different electronic market places,
the attempt at rationalization and simplification was per-
verted by high-frequency traders. They used loopholes in
the complex architecture of the system to trick other tra-
ders into selling stocks at lower prices and buying them at
higher prices than they should have.
15. Callon’s call for new performativities is not so strange
given Bruno Latour’s own appraisal of postenvironment-
alism as a way to solve the climate crisis (2011: 17–25).
Latour compares the environmental crisis to doctor
Frankenstein’s abandonment of his monster.
Frankenstein’s mistake was not to make the monster,
but his failure to take care of his own creature.
Similarly we should not solve the environmental crisis
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by reducing the human impact on the world, but by
managing it more efficaciously. That is why Latour sup-
ports postenvironmentalist calls to combat, for instance,
greenhouse gasses, not by reducing human emissions, but
by counterbalancing emissions with other chemical sub-
stances artificially pumped into the air. Callon calls for a
similar level of experimentation in solving economic
crises. The question is whether we have so much faith
in our own imaginative capacities as to ensure that we
will not destroy the planet in a vain attempt to save it.
16. The same argument applies to social subjection.
According to Lazzarato, social subjection restricts the
range of activities that people recognize as deserving
remuneration. For example, financial firms frequently
deal with over-worked interns (Neate, 2015). These
unpaid employees work long hours because they are
interpellated by a discourse that professes a life-style of
work without sleep. They are told that, in order to
become a financial broker themselves, they have to sur-
vive the hostile months of internship. They hence produce
surplus value for the firm, but are unpaid because it is
framed as an ‘opportunity’ instead of ‘employment’. For
an overview of the history of financial social subjection,
see Preda (2005, 2009b).
17. Marazzi (2011: 55) calls this the ‘‘Google model of pro-
duction’’. Instead of investing in constant or variable cap-
ital, firms focus on capturing wealth-production outside
the official production process. For instance, the con-
sumer is allowed to book flight tickets online instead of
having to go to the airport to buy them. Consequently the
firm does not need to pay workers, because the consumer
is performing the same work unwaged in exchange for
lower prices. This sounds like a fair development, but
we mostly do not know this is not a hidden scheme to
generate higher profits while the decline in consumer
prices remains quite modest (Pasquale, 2015).
Eventually the firm with the most consumer data, gath-
ered on the Internet, accumulates the greatest amounts of
wealth. This is the reason why Jaron Lanier (2014) pro-
poses that ‘the siren server’ should pay everyone for the
data they provide about themselves on the Internet.
18. It seems as if neoliberalism celebrates difference and
innovation (Foucault, 2004: 148). The goal of the homo
oeconomicus is to turn his human capital into profit, and
so he is invited to find his niche market to transform his
talents into sources of income. This is, according to
Lazzarato (2015: 167), only partly true. One is only free
to express one’s unique differences insofar as one can
commodify them. Solely those differences that respond
to economic demands are praiseworthy. The semiotics
with which people can express their identities are all
homogenized to the capitalist semiotic of profitability.
One can be different as long as there is a market for it.
Green hippies buying sustainable goods is fine, but green
activists cutting on consumption are not. ‘‘The semiotic
assembly line not only produces knowledge and informa-
tion, but also attitudes, stereotypes of behaviour, and
submission to hierarchies’’ (Lazzarato, 2014: 71). The
ideology of free enterprise mystifies a politics that
determines which subjectivities are possible under current
economic conditions and which are impossible.
19. Lazzarato here misses an opportunity to link his theory
of debt to Agamben’s theory of the state of exception
(1998). Agamben argues that human rights include
people into the legal system, but through exclusion. One
can only enjoy human rights as long as one fulfils the
criteria for ‘humanity’ and can rely on a state willing to
enforce these human rights. According to Lazzarato as
well, the debtor is precariously included in the economic
sphere, but can always be excluded by his creditors.
20. Balibar (2013) rightly remarks that every creditor is also
someone’s debtor in a financialized economy.
Consequently, forgiving another’s debts is not so easy.
Financial firms have to insist on the creditworthy behav-
iour of governments, because otherwise they will be left
with untrustworthy investments and go bankrupt to their
own creditors. Debt forgiveness is therefore a dubious
solution without a more radical reform of the financial
system.
21. Although Callon (1998: 259) mentions that the ones suf-
fering from negative externalities should participate in the
negotiations to reframe the network that produced these
externalities, he does not connect this finding to the
equally valid point of unequal calculating capacities
(Callon, 1998: 45; Van Dijk, 2013: 115–117). Not all
actors have equal means to participate in negotiations
because some have more devices at their disposal to per-
form the market than others. Economists have computer
models, mathematical competences, persuasion skills, etc.
to rearticulate economic theories, while ordinary people
lack these resources. That is why eventually Callon can
only think of engineers, market professionals and similar
profiles to reframe the market.
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